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This study uses household level data collected in Shandong Province of China to study rural 
formal financial institutions’ lending volume decisions, the number of lending approvals, and 
respondents’ attitude towards interest rates on formal loan in China’s rural setting. The main 
body of the dissertation consists of three separate chapters. 
The first chapter of the main body in the dissertation examines how rural households’ 
characteristics affect one important dimension of lending decision-making practices of 
financial institutions. This is the decision of how much to lend to a borrower (the volume 
decision). This paper relaxes the restrictive joint decision assumptions of the Tobit model and 
consider the volume decision of the loans given by financial institutions conditional on, rather 
than jointly with, the decision whether to lend to a borrower in the first place. This paper 
estimates this model using a two-step econometric method and field survey data from the 
province of Shandong in China. Findings show that households’ characteristics which affect 
loan approval differ from those which affect decision regarding loan volume. These findings 
thus broaden and deepen the extant studies on formal lending decisions in rural settings. 
The second chapter of the main body in the dissertation attempts to identify significant 
household characteristics that formal lender apply when they classify formal loan lending 
over a period of years, this study interprets all loan rejection(s) as a zero number and treats at 
least one time loan approval as a positive integral (≥1). Thus, binary outcomes are estimated 
related to lending numbers over a five-year period using a complementary log-log binomial 
model and field survey data from the province of Shandong, China. Findings imply that the 
Chinese government should strive to improve education in rural areas and protect land rights 
of all farm families with the aim of increasing farmers’ chances for access to formal loans. 
These policy implications thus broaden and deepen the extant studies on formal lending 
II 
 
decisions in rural settings. 
Finally, the third chapter of main body in the dissertation identifies the determinants 
which affect whether potential borrowers feel that interest rates on formal loans are too high 
by examining their attitudes towards interest rates on formal loans. The analysis is based on a 
sample of 290 respondents from rural Shandong in China; 22 percent of the respondents feel 
that interest rates on formal loans are too high. A corrective method for sample selectivity, 
which builds on the work of van de Ven and van Praag (1981), has been applied in probit 
analysis. Empirical analysis indicates that respondents’ gender and main cash income source 
have important influences on their attitudes towards high interest rates recognition. Empirical 
analysis indicates that respondent’s gender, main cash income source, and family’s total asset 
value have important influences on their attitude towards high interest rates recognition on 
formal loan. Empirical findings imply that financial institutions should pay more attention on 
borrowers who is female and whose main cash income source is farm work, and the 
government should change the monopolization of RCCs by promoting better competition in 
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Developing finance in rural areas of many developing countries has the potential to 
expand users’ opportunities for “more efficient technology adoption and resource allocation” 
(World Bank, 2008). In China, a land that represents about a quarter of the global population, 
many people in rural areas also suffer from inadequate liquidity supplies or financial services. 
If rural residents lack access to formal credit, then their ability to actively participate in and 
benefit from the development process would be limited (Li et al., 2011). 
As a response to China’s current rural financing situation, it is necessary to understand 
formal financial institutions’ lending decisions and lending numbers from specific 
perspectives, such as loan volume and the number of loan approvals. Also, it is necessary to 
identify and target those who feel that interest rates on formal loans are too high and discover 
how to set them up with proper financial services. 
Against this background, the current study uses household level data collected in rural 
Shandong, China. The study has three broad objectives, each of which constitutes a core 
chapter topic. The first objective is to study lending volume decisions of formal financial 
institutions in rural Shandong, China with a view to understand the lending volume process, 
namely, whether lending volume decisions are made jointly with, or conditional on, lending 
approval decisions. The second objective is to investigate the number of lending approvals by 
formal financial institutions in rural Shandong, China with a view to identify significant 
household characteristics that formal lenders apply when they classify formal loan lending 
over a period of years. And third, the study explores rural residents’ attitudes towards interest 
rates on formal loan (lending rates of formal loans), with the purpose of looking for those who 
feel that interest rates on formal loan are too high.  
The Chapter Two indicates that households’ characteristics which affect loan approval 
differ from those which affect decision regarding loan volume using a two-step econometric 
method. The Chapter Three implies that the Chinese government should strive to improve 




farmers’ chances for access to formal loans using a complementary log-log binomial model. 
The Chapter Four shows that respondent’s gender, main cash income source, and family’s 
total asset value have important influences on their attitude towards high interest rates 
recognition on formal loans using a corrective method for sample selectivity.  
These three core chapters related to studying formal loans, to some extent, complement 
each other. Lending volume decisions are comprised of deciding whether to lend in stage one, 
and the decision of how much to lend (i.e., volume) in stage two. Hence, studying the number 
of lending approvals is helpful to understand lending volume, namely, what are the factors 
affecting the decision of lending approval? Correspondingly, studying lending volume 
decisions is helpful to understand the importance of lending approval on the entire process. 
Studying lending rates also indirectly helps to understand why financial institutions give zero 
lending approval and zero lending volume to all rural farmers on the basis of their censoring 
work. This is possibly because high lending rates make lenders suspect the borrower’s 
capability of punctual loan repayment. Correspondingly, the study of lending volume and the 
number of lending approvals indirectly shows that the lending rate is an important 
determinant on lending practice. 
Note, however, that the data used in the study needs to be viewed and acknowledged in 
light of its limitations. First, all respondent rural household characteristics were gathered after 
the five-year period in which loans were granted, but the initial decision to approve the first 
loan was made on the basis of the rural households’ characteristics at the beginning of the 
five-year period. Clearly, there is a potential endogeneity problem associated with explaining 
past loan on the basis of current characteristics. For example, a household’s current asset 
situation is presumably a function of how many loans that household has received in the past, 
and the volumes of these loans. In other words, a household’s assets will tend to be higher if a 
household has received a loan. Hence, a covariate asset used in the third chapter, is suspected 
of endogeneity, which could make the findings in this article biased and inconsistent. 
Second, data limitations also limits the number of household characteristics that I can 
employ as covariates in my various estimation, and thus, some valuable findings might be 
omitted. There are many variables that were collected in the survey that I would like to use 




and the number of laborers for non-farm production in survey period, but that I cannot use 
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HOW DO RURAL HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AFFECT FORMAL LOAN 
LENDING DECISIONS? TWO-STEP ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION BASED ON 




Formal loans from financial institutions are an important element which serve agricultural 
production and improve the living standards of rural households in extensive rural areas of 
developing countries. In China, a land which has been undergoing a series of reforms of all 
segments and areas since 1979, enormous changes have taken place in the rural financial 
market. In particular, differences in regional economic structures have led to changes in rural 
finance demand in different regions of the country (Xie et al., 2005). For example, in 
Shandong Province, which is one of the developed coastal areas of China, rural households’ 
demand for formal loans for nonfarm activities is soaring. Many rural households, which are 
mainly smallholders, not only need liquidity for seasonal production and current consumption 
but also to finance non-farm investments, construction and ceremonial social events (e.g., 
weddings). To meet these different kinds of capital demand for both farm and nonfarm needs, 
China’s rural financial institutions, which are managed by the People’s Bank of China 
(Central Bank of China), channel large volumes of financial capital to the country’s 
agricultural sector and rural areas as part of a comprehensive policy aimed at boosting the 
incomes and welfares of rural households. Since formal lending in rural areas has changed 
over the last several decades from a demand perspective, studies on formal loan lending 
practices deserved more attention in China and other developing countries.  
Previous literature mainly sheds light on agricultural lending because most formal loans 
were granted for agricultural production in rural areas1. Past research has mainly focused on  
 
 
1 In fact, loans from formal financial institutions for farm and non-farm purposes in rural areas are often subsumed under 
“agricultural lending” in China. I discuss this in more detail later. To emphasize the source of loans, I use “formal loan” 




five aspects of agricultural lending. The first aspect addresses the agricultural lending decision 
process. Stover et al. (1985), Featherstone et al. (2007) and Olagunju (2010) examine the 
agricultural loan decision process and analyze the factors from the perspective of the 
individual loan officer or financial institution. The second aspect deals with the testing of 
credit scoring or risk models of the lending decision. Hardy and Weed (1980), Barry et al. 
(1981), Thomas (2000), Zech and Pederson (2004), and Katchova and Barry (2005) examine 
such models which are used to estimate loan requirements and potential risks for lenders and 
help them decide whether or not to grant a loan to applicants. The third aspect addresses how 
internal and external characteristics of financial institutions themselves affect agricultural 
lending, Studies such as Mazzocco (1991), Bard et al. (2000), and Ahrendsen (2003) are 
representative of this branch of the literature. The fourth aspect explores the relationship 
between the informal and formal lending sectors in developing countries. For example, 
Turvey and Kong (2010), Guirkinger (2006), and Ghate (1992) examine the relationship 
between informal and formal lending in China, Peru, and Asian countries, respectively. The 
fifth aspect models the role of the informal and formal credit sectors (lenders) in developing 
countries. Boucher and Guirkinger (2007) and Boucher et al. (2008) show that asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers can oblige formal lenders to rely on collateral to 
solve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems inherent in credit transactions.   
While the literature provides many insights into formal lending, one important aspect of 
lending decision-making practices has received very little attention to date: Is the lending 
volume decision conditional on or taken jointly with the lending approval decision? In this 
article, I attempt to answer the question so as to broaden and deepen the previous research on 
the lending decisions.  
The lending process generally consist of the following stages: 1) Examination and 
approval of a loan application. At this stage the lender carefully examines a loan applicant’s 
qualification so as to determine whether to lend to this applicant or not. 2) Loan contracting 
and distribution. At this stage the lender determines the volume of an approved loan and 
distributes it to the applicant. Accordingly, the lending decisions are made up of the decision 
of whether to lend (i.e., the approval decision in stage 1) and the decision of how much to 




These two lending decisions are modeled jointly in most previous analyses using single 
equation methods, such as the Tobit model, based on one-step empirical estimation (see, for 
example, Featherstone et al. (2007) and Olagunju (2010)). This assumes that the lender 
decides whether and how much to lend simultaneously, and that both decisions are influenced 
by the same factors and in the same direction (Lin and Schmidt 1984). In other words, a 
covariate that increases the probability of loan approval also increases the loan volume. 
This hypothesis may be restrictive. For example, women are often viewed as more 
risk-averse than men in regards to economic activities (see, for example, Fletschner and 
Kenney, 2011; Gockel, 2009; etc.). For this reason, the desired loan volume of female-headed 
households is possibly less than male-headed. In practice, each lending institution has its own 
benchmark yield, which is the lowest profit from lending and is determined by the loan’s 
interest proceeds and lending costs. Under the premise of securing loan repayment capacity, 
the loan’s interest proceeds depend on the volume of loan, the level of interest rate, and the 
terms of the loan. Obviously, if the volume of a loan that has been applied for is too small, it 
might be difficult for the financial institution to reach the benchmark yield and it might 
therefore decide not to approve the loan. Therefore, if faced with loan applications from both 
female-headed and male-headed households with otherwise identical repayment capacities, 
interest rates, loan terms, and lending costs, but with different desired loan volumes, a lender 
will be more likely to lend to a male-headed household. In other words, all other things being 
equal, it may be more difficult for female-headed households to obtain loan approval from a 
financial institution even if their creditworthiness is good. However, if a loan application by a 
female-headed household is approved, the lending institution might be more likely to decide 
to provide the loan volume that she has applied for than in the case of a male-headed 
household. This is because empirical research has shown that women play a more active role 
regarding loan usages, which has a positive effect on loan repayment (see, for example, Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998; D’Espallier et al., 2011; etc.). Hence, it is possible that female-headed 
households will be less likely to receive loans, but more likely to borrow larger volumes if 
their loan applications are approved. If true, the covariate ‘female-headed household’ (i.e., the 
gender of household head) will affect loan approval and loan volume in different directions.  




decisions separately. I test the null hypothesis of joint versus independent approval and 
volume decisions to determine which hypothesis is suitable for my dataset and econometric 
analysis. 
To sum up, the primary goal of this article is to propose a two-step econometric model to 
model how households’ characteristics affect lenders’ decisions to approve loan applications, 
and determine the volumes of these loans. I test this model using field survey data from the 
Province of Shandong in China. A two-step econometric model captures the characteristics 
which influence lenders’ decisions to approve loans to rural households using a binary 
sub-model and, conditional on the loan approval, the characteristics that influence their 
decisions on loan volume using a conditional truncated sub-model.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section 2 I briefly 
introduce some background information of formal loans in rural China. In section 3 I develop 
a theoretical framework, which builds on the work of Katchova and Miranda (2004), to 
illustrate decisions of formal loan lending. In section 4 I present and estimate the one-step and 
the proposed two-step models for the loan approval and volume decisions, and compare these 
two models. In section 5 I describe the data. I present and discuss the results in section 6, and 
conclude in section 7.  
 
2.2. Background  
 
2.2.1. A Brief Introduction to China’s Agricultural Lending Development 
 
China’s formal financial system in rural areas can trace its origins back to the 1950s2. At that 
time, Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), located in nearly every township (of which there 
were over 30,000), were set up by the government to serve the credit needs of producers. In 
the centrally planned economic era (before 1978), these RCCs were “designed to channel  
 
2 Officially, rural financial institutions in China do not include informal financial institutions, as these institutions are 
neither regulated nor supervised by the People’s Bank of China (PBC, Central Bank of China) and the deposits with most of 
these institutions are not protected by the state (Shen and Cheng, 2004). Therefore, in this paper, rural financial institutions 
refer to formal rural financial institutions only. I do not consider those semi-formal rural financial institutions, such as 





necessary credit to the agricultural sector so that it could provide cheaper grain and other raw 
inputs to support the development of the capital-intensive industrial sector” (Shen and Cheng, 
2004).  
In 1984, accompanied by economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s, the Chinese 
government started to reform its banking system. However, the reform process was very slow, 
especially as concerns the rural financial system. A comprehensive financial sector was not 
established until the mid-1990s. Then the formal financial sector in rural China was made up 
of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the ADBC, RCCs and Rural Postal Savings (RPS), 
where ABC lent to agricultural enterprises, rural cooperatives, and village organizations, but 
usually not to individual rural households, and RPS were the only depository financial 
institutions.  
Moreover, during the mid-1990s, two main changes in agricultural lending were 
observed (Shen and Rozelle, 2004). First, banks began to depend more on collateral to secure 
loans. Second, there was a sharp shift in the lending preferences of banks in favor of private 
firms including almost all rural enterprises and many privatized small and medium 
state-owned enterprises. During this period, formal institutions (RCCs and banks) were 
reluctant to lend to small farmers due to the high administrative costs and risks of such loans 
and a low ceiling on interest rates set by the central bank (Cheng and Xu, 2003). 
Beginning in 2001, China initiated “a campaign to increase RCC lending to small 
farmers, and lending accelerated further following the issuance of a “Number 1 Document” in 
2004 stating the government’s intent to raise rural incomes and boost grain production” (Gale 
and Collender, 2006). Currently, RCCs “play an overriding role in the rural financial system 
in China” (Guo and Jia, 2009), and “more than 80 percent of formal agricultural loans in 
China are made by the country’s 30,000-plus Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs)”(Gale and 
Collender, 2006). In addition, loans which are classified as ‘agricultural’ are increasingly used 
for nonagricultural purposes such as house construction, school fees, health care costs or 
nonfarm business expenses, etc. According to the People’s Bank of Chinas’ guidelines, micro 
loans may be used for agricultural production, purchase of small farming machinery; services 
before, during or after agricultural production; or housing, medical service, education and 




To sum up, in recent decades the Chinese financial system has built up a plentiful supply 
of capital for agricultural lending. Chinese policymakers are increasingly channeling lending 
to smallholder farmers and agribusiness.  
 
2.2.2. Trends in Agricultural Lending in Recent Decades  
 
Figures 1 and 2 below respectively show the balance of agricultural loans for the whole 
country and the Shandong Province of China from 1979 to 2009.  
As shown in the Figures, the balance of agricultural loans in the whole country and the 
Province of Shandong increased very slowly and gently during the first 16 years from 
1979-1995. The relative shares of agricultural loans as a proportion of total loans fluctuated 
within a relatively broad brand and displays a rough downtrend as agriculture’s share of total 
GDP declined. However, the balance of agricultural loans for the whole country and the 
Province of Shandong increased during the 1996-2009 period. The agricultural loan balance 
of the whole country and the Shandong Province respectively reached the equivalent of 
21,623 billion Yuan (RMB)3 and 296 billion Yuan in 2009, up 19,704 billion Yuan and 271 
billion Yuan since 1996, respectively. In 2009, the agricultural share of all loans for the entire 
country and the Province of Shandong respectively was 5% and 11%, a 2 and 4 
percentage-point increase from 1996, respectively. Since Shandong Province is one of China’s 
most prosperous agricultural regions, it is not unusual that the agricultural share of all loans is 
higher than the average level of the whole country since the mid-1990s, when the reform of 
the banking system started to commercialize and modernize (see Figures 1 and 2). Hence, 
Shandong province provides an interesting setting for studying formal loan lending practices 




































































































Agricultural share of all loans (China,the whole country, left axis)
Agricultural Loan Balance (China,the whole country, right axis)
 
Fig.1. Agricultural Loan Balance, the Whole Country of China, Yearly, 1979-2009 





























































































































Agricultural share of all loans (China, Shandong Province, left axis)
Agricultural loan balance (China, Shandong Province,right axis)
 
Fig.2. Agricultural Loan Balance, Shandong Province of China, Yearly,1979-2009 
Source: Shandong Province Statistical Yearbook, China (Various Issues) 
 
2.3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Information and enforcement problems cause credit market imperfections and even the 
complete failure of these markets (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). Such loan constraints are 
especially likely to arise under the conditions prevailing in developing countries (see, for 
example, Conning and Udry, 2005). I consider three lending decisions for any loan 
application: full approval, part approval, and rejection. A household experiences full approval 
if its desired loan is approved in full by the lending institution. If its desired loan is 
completely refused, the household suffered from loan constraints. In between these two 
situations, I refer to partial approval if it’s desired loan is partially approved.  




each formal loan applicant (rural household), and there is a distribution of these indicators 
across all applicants. I call this indicator the applicant’s “liquidity condition”, which is based 
on his or her qualitative and quantitative characteristics. The financial institutions have to 
measure their expected gains and losses by carefully assessing each applicant’s liquidity 
condition. Above an upper liquidity condition threshold, the financial institution’s expected 
utility from complete full loan approval exceeds that from partial loan approval or rejection. 
Below a lower liquidity condition threshold, rejection takes place. In between these thresholds, 
the financial institution’s utility from partial loan approval exceeds that from either full 












I propose a two-step theoretical model of formal lending decisions which builds on 
Katchova and Miranda (2004). Consider a financial institution, indexed by ,i that provides a 
formal loan to a rural household j . If the rural household submits one loan application, the 
financial institutions has to decide whether to approve this application, and how much of the 
desired loan to approve iα .  
In this article, I consider two estimation models: a conventional one-step model, which 
assumes that the loan approval and lending volume are decided simultaneously, and a 
two-step model, which assumes that the lending volume process is made conditional on the 







Fig.3. Decisions of Formal Loan Lending 




3.3.1. One-Step Model 
 
















where iα is the volume of granted loan, iR is interest rate for the granted loan, iT is the term 
of the granted loan, iii TRα  are the total expected proceeds for the lending decision, 
v
ib  is 
the possible expenditure or loss for loan lending such as the costs of screening a loan 
application , fib  is the necessary cost for loan lending such as the salary of loan officers
4.  
Maximization of expected financial institution utility yields expressions related to the 
loan applicant’s ( j ) household characteristics, which can embody the potential ability of 
creating gains for using loans and guaranteeing loan repayment at a due date. Therefore, iα is 
related to xj , a set of observable rural household’s characteristics such as the education level 
of the household head, land size, number of laborers, etc. Formally, ),(
iji
xg ααα εβα ′= , 
where αβ ′  is a vector of parameters, and iαε  captures unmeasured factors related to formal 
loan lending (Katchova and Miranda, 2004). 
In the one-step model, the financial institution’s decision to lend or not is equivalent to a 
solution in which at least one of the lower bounds is binding: 0=iα . The approval decision 
is modeled jointly with the volume decision ( iα ) in the sense that the same covariates (xj) and 




4 In practice, for the collateral which is used for a loan application, the market value of pledged asset P usually equals or 
exceeds the loan amount and its interest profits, i.e., RTP αα +≥ . However, for simplicity, I assume that 
RTP αα += so that function (1) is feasible. In addition, for parsimony, I omit the proceeds from the fees that all 




3.3.2. Two-Step Model 
 
In the two-step model, the volume decision is conditional on the loan approval decision. The 
financial institution first decides whether to approve a loan to applicant j , and if approval is 






















In the two-step estimation model, 0=ic  indicates loan rejection and is associated with the 
first term in the discrete maximization operation, and 1=ic  indicates a lending approval 
decision and is associated with the second term in the discrete maximization operation. There 
is a trade-off between obtaining expected proceeds and covering the costs associated with the 
lending approval. 
As in the one-step model, maximization of the expected utility of proceeds in (2) yields 
expressions that relate the lender’s volume decision )( iα  to xj, a set of observable rural 
household’s characteristics. However, maximization of expected utility of proceeds also yields 
expressions that relate the lender’s approval decision ( ic ) to a possibly different set of 
observable rural household’s characteristics zj in the two-step model. 
Formally, ),(
icji
zhc εγ ′= , where γ  is a vector of parameters and εci represents unmeasured 
factors related to the decision of lending approval (Katchova and Miranda, 2004). 
If the same covariates (zj and xj) and the same coefficients )( αβγ and  determine the 
loan decision ( ic ), and the volume decisions（ iα ）, then the one-step and two-step models are 
identical. The two-step model allows the same covariate to affect lending approval and the 
volume decisions in different ways (via different coefficients) and different covariates to 





2.4. Econometric Methods 
 
Before addressing estimation and functional form issues I address the problem of data 
truncation due to a large percentage zero lending volumes (i.e., households whose 
applications are rejected). This truncation problem differs from the “sample 
selection—incidental truncation” problem that is usually corrected using Heckman’s two-step 
procedure (Greene, 2000; Katchova and Miranda, 2004). Heckman’s two-step model is not 
suitable here because the loan volumes for rural households whose applications are rejected 
are equal to zero rather than being unobserved (Lin and Schmidt, 1984). 
Hence, following the theoretical framework, I outline the empirical models used to 
determine the households’ characteristics which influence lenders’ approval and volume 
decisions. The approval variable ic is a discrete two-choice variable, the volume of granted 
loan iα  is a nonnegative variable. This leads to different econometric models for ic and iα . 
The loan approval decision ic is modeled with a probit model. The granted loan volume 
decision iα is modeled jointly with the approval decision using Tobit model. The granted loan 
volume decision is modeled conditional on the loan approval decision using a truncated 
regression. 
I assume that the disturbances in the econometric models of the decision of lending 
approval, ic and the lending volume iα  are independent. This assumption has been implicitly 
maintained in the literature when separate models are estimated with any two variables ( iic α, ) 
as a dependent variable (Katchova and Miranda, 2004).  
If a lender (formal financial institution) decides not to grant a loan to an applicant (rural 
household) ( 0=ic ) then automatically 0=iα , whereas if a lender decides to grant a loan 
( 1=ic ) then 0>iα . Let iY  equal iα . For a lender with 0=ic , the likelihood contribution 
is )0( =icP , whereas for a lender with 1=ic , the likelihood contribution is 




probability density function (Katchova and Miranda, 2004). Given the independence of iα   
(conditional on 1=ic ), the joint density )0|( >ii YYf factors into )0|( >iif αα (Katchova 
and Miranda, 2004). 
 
2.4.1.Probit Model for the Loan Approval Decision 
 
The discrete choice of whether to approve or to reject a loan application ( ic ) can be estimated 
with a probit model or a logit model. Following Katchova and Miranda (2004), I employ the 
following probit model: 
 
)3()'()1( ii zcP γΦ==  
 
where )(⋅Φ is the standard normal cumulative probability distribution (cdf), zi is an 
1×R vector of household’s characteristics for rural household j ，and γ is a vector of 
coefficients. 
 
2.4.2. Tobit and Truncated Regression Models for the Lending Volume Decision 
 
The discrete decision of whether to approve a loan and the continuous decision of the volume 
to lend is estimated using a Tobit model (see, for example, Featherstone et al. (2007)). The 




x αα εβα +′=  
 
where xi is an 1×S vector of rural households’ characteristics for lender i， αβ is vector of 
coefficients, and 
iα
ε are independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2σ (Katchova and Miranda, 2004). If 
∗




zero. When ∗iα  is positive, 
∗= ii αα . 







































where )(⋅φ is the standard normal probability density function (pdf) (Katchova and Miranda, 
2004). Equation (5) represents the lending approval decision, and is a valid probit model if 
considered separately from equation (6). Equation (6) represents a truncated regression for the 
positive values of the continuous loan volume decision ( 0>iα ). The Tobit model arises when 
the approval decision in equation (5) and the loan volume decision in equation (6) have the 
same variables xj and the same parameter vector αβ  (Katchova and Miranda, 2004). In the 
Tobit model, a variable that increases the probability of approval will also increase the mean 
of volume granted (Lin and Schmidt, 1984). 
As shown in Katchova and Miranda (2004), the log-likelihood for the Tobit model 
consists of the probabilities for non-approval and a classical regression for the positive values 





























Cragg (1971) relaxed the assumption that the same covariates and the same parameter vector 




consider a hurdle model in which a lender makes a two-step decision. In the first step, a probit 
model represents a lender’s choice of whether to approve a loan ( ic ): 
 
)8()'()0( ii zcP γ−Φ==  
 
If this hurdle is crossed and ic =1, a truncated regression (equation (6)) describes the choice 
of how much loan to lend ( 0>iα ). The log-likelihood in Cragg’s model is thus a sum of the 
log-likelihood of the probit model (the first two terms) and the log-likelihood of the truncated 





























2.4.3. Choice of Econometric Models 
 
A choice between the Tobit specification and Cragg alternative is a test of the restriction zj=xj 
and σβγ α /=  in equation (9) (Lin and Schmidt, 1984; Green, 2000；Katchova and Miranda, 
2004). Given zj=xj as the first condition, the second condition σβγ α /= is a testable 
restriction. Thus, testing the Tobit model against the more general Cragg model involves the 
following hypotheses: 
H0: Tobit, with the likelihood function in equation (7) 
H1: Cragg model (probit and a truncated regression estimated separately), with the 
likelihood function in equation (9). 
Furthermore, the Tobit model can be tested against the Cragg model by estimating a 
probit, a truncated regression, and a Tobit model with the same covariates (xj), and by 
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where λ  is chi-square distributed under the null hypothesis with degrees of freedom equal 




The data used in this paper were collected in Shandong Province (China) in July 2010 by 
face-to-face interviews. 394 rural households were randomly selected from 5 villages in one 
town (Man Zhuang) and one county (Ning Yang). The survey collected detailed information 
on households’ formal borrowing activities over the last 5 years (i.e., from July 2006 to July 
2010) as well as households’ basic characteristics. 
During the survey, respondents identified whether their loan applications had been 
approved by financial institutions in the past five years, and the loan volume they was last 
granted. The survey information gathered also includes more general quantitative and 
qualitative rural households’ characteristics which are considered important determinants of 
formal loan lending. Overall, 204 households were eliminated because they did not participate 
in my survey or did not apply for a formal loan during the past five years. This left 190 
households that had applied for at least one formal loan. Of these, a further 22 households had 
to be removed since the information they provided was incomplete. Of the remaining 168 
households that had applied for a formal loan in the past five years, 85 were approved by 
financial institutions to receive a loan.  
Among the 85 households with approved loans, 60% applied for a farm loan, for 
example for commercial greenhouse vegetable production or purchasing a tractor, etc. The 
other 40% of these households applied for non-farm loans, such as for nonfarm business 
activities, medical care, children’s education, house or car purchases, etc. This shows that 
formal loan lending in the rural areas of Shandong Province of China is not confined to 




is 32.18 thousands Yuan.  
Since the period span related to the formal loan survey was five years, a loan for an 
individual respondent household might be disbursed by a financial institution to outside of the 
period studied. For the purpose of achieving accurate information, the survey collected 
current respondent household information within the survey period, namely, a retrospective 
survey related to respondent’s historical household information was not conducted because 
many of those randomized respondents, especially when they are not household heads, rarely 
know the full households’ information history. For the sake of developing the empirical 
analysis, however, it is thus very important to pick appropriate covariates from the collected 
information. A few of the covariates, which not only represent socioeconomic characteristics 
of rural households but also are exogenous, are hypothesized to be relevant in the loan 
approval and loan volume decisions. These include zero-one indicators for whether the 
household head is female, and has non-farm production skills. Also, in China, non-farm skill 
does not always refer to those professional skills that need professional training and study, 
some simple physical labor jobs, such as sanitation worker, are viewed as non-farm skill as 
well. Some respondents might say that the head of his or her household has no non-farm skill, 
the plausible reason is either that the household head is born with a physical disability or that 
the household head is too old for farm work (aged over 65 years old). Not many household 
heads in rural China absolutely did not have non-farm skill, of course. Therefore, these two 
zero-one indicators are appropriate for the study and are exogenous for the number of lending 
approvals analysis. 
The average age of a household head over a period of years reflects that household’s 
structure. Household structures was divided into four main types on the basis of age: (1) 
young household, defined as a household head’s age between 18 and 35 years old; 
(2)middle-aged household, defined as a household head’ age between 36 and 50 years old; 
(3)elderly household, defined as a household head’s age between 51 and 65 years old; and 
(4)very elderly household, defined as a household head aged 66 years old or over. Hence, 
every responding household can be easily determined on the basis of the division of 
household structure for the empirical analysis. 




Farmers can’t sell it, and they can’t use it for collateral on a loan. In 1997, rural households 
were allowed to sign a long-term lease of 30 years for the right to work a plot, which was 
allocated according to shares in village populations. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the 
amount of farm land of every respondent household could not change from 2006 to 2010 due 
to undated signed leases in the survey area. Therefore, the covariate land is exogenous and 
introduced into the analysis.  
The household head’s education level was also considered exogenous because almost no 
household heads in rural China underwent education-change over the study period, hence, it 
can also be introduced into the empirical analysis. Additionally, the covariate number, which 
is total number of loan approval except the last one in the five-year period, is also used in the 




Descriptive statistics of dependent variables and covariates 
Variables Definition Mean Std.Dev. Obs. 
Dependent Variables     
Approval Whether to approve to grant a loan to an 
applicant over the last five years 
0.51 0.50 168 
Volume The loan volume they were last granted over 
the last five years in Yuan (thousands)  
16.28 25.44 168 
     Zero loan volume  0 0 83 
     Positive loan volume 32.18 27.73 85 
Covariates     
Gender Whether the household head is female 
(female=1, male=0) 
0.05 0.21 168 
YongHH 1 if household head’s age is between 18 and 35 
years old; otherwise=0 
0.08 0.27 168 
MiddleHH 1 if household head’s age is between 36 and 50 
years old; otherwise=0 
0.57 0.50 168 
ElderHH 1 if household head’s age is between 51 and 65 
years old; otherwise=0 
0.32 0.47 168 
Education Household head’s education level in years 8.93 3.17 168 
Nonfarmskill Whether household head has non-farm skill 
(yes=1, non=0) 
0.19 0.39 168 
Land Amount of farm land in Mu (1 Mu≈0.16 Acre) 3.05 3.59 168 
Number The total number of lending except the last one 
over the last five years 






2.6. Results and Discussion 
 
All of the alternative model specifications outlined above were estimated using maximum 
likelihood methods. Initially, considering that some rural households might apply and be 
granted a loan only once over the last five years, hence, the covariate Number is used on 
disbursed loan volume decision rather than lending approval decision analysis. Overall, the 
same set of covariates was used in all cases excepting the aforementioned exception.  
The Tobit model is first tested against the more general Cragg specification of a separate 
probit model and a truncated regression model using the test statistic in equation (10). The 
likelihood ratio test statistics of 49.94 leads us to reject the Tobit model in favor of the Cragg 
model. Hence, the same household characteristics do not influence both the lending approval 
decision and the disbursed loan volume decision in the same way via the restricted 
coefficients in the Tobit model. I therefore focus on the signs and marginal effects of the 
covariates in the Cragg model in the following. 
Results of the probit model for the loan approval decision, and the truncated regression 
and Tobit models for the loan volume decision, are given in Table 2. Both parameter estimates 
and average marginal effects (AMEs) are reported. In addition, the Cragg model can also be 
obtained with the craggit command in Stata, described in Burk (2009). The process of craggit 
command incorporates a probit model in the first tier and a truncated regression model in the 
second tier, hence, the empirical results are same with the result from the probit and truncated 
models. I report the values of “Wald chi-square”, “Sigma”, and “Log Likelihood” from 
craggit command, which indicates Cragg’s model fits my data as a whole, for empirical 











Table 2:  
Probit, truncated regression, and Tobit model results for the loan approval and loan 
volume decisions 
 Parameter Estimates Average Marginal 
Effects (AMEs) 























 N=168 N=85 N=168 N=168 N=85 
Covariates 





















































































Sigma  44.82*** 
(10.34) 
32.33 
(2.63)   
Wald chi2(8)  6.81    
LR chi2(7) 123.02***     
LR chi2(8)   89.76***   
Pseudo R2 0.5283  0.09   
Log Likelihood -54.9256 -371.7904 -451.6935   
Model Pearson Test Chi2(91)=
110.08* 
    
% correct predictions 59     
Craggit:      
Sigma=44.82***(10.34)    
Wald chi2(7)=71.15***    
Log Likelihood=-426.7160    
      
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; standard 
errors in parentheses. coefficients, AME values, and their corresponding standard error  





2.6.1. Parameter Estimates of Probit Model 
 
The results of the probit model indicate that households with a head who has a higher 
education level and non-farm labor skills are more likely to be approved for a loan. Higher 
education increases productivity so that more value can be created, and having non-farm labor 
skill means more income sources. Thus, these two characteristics have strong positive effects 
(i.e., significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively) on the probability of loan approval. 
In addition, as can be seen in column 2 of Table 2, the covariate land has a statistically 
significant positive effect (significance at 1% level) on the loan approval decision. More land 
means that loan applicants’ potential productivity or rent proceeds can be increased; hence, it 
is one indicator of repayment capacity.  
 
2.6.2. Parameter Estimates of Truncated Regression Model 
 
The parameter estimates for the truncated regression model for the loan volume decision 
show that the household head’s education level and whether or not he/she has non-farm 
production skills have significant positive effects (significance at 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively) on the loan volume. Hence, having a household head with a higher education 
and non-farm production skills increases the probability of loan approval and the volume of 
the approved loan.  
Note that the coefficients of the Tobit model in Table 2 usually display about the 
basically same sign and significance as the coefficients in the probit model. This indicates that 
the joint decision of loan approval and loan volume in the Tobit model is heavily influenced 
by the lending approval decision. These results highlight the important advantage of the 
Cragg model that it allows (possibly different) covariates to have different effects on the loan 
approval and loan volume decisions. 
In addition, column 5 and 6 of Table 2 are the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the 
probability of loan approval and loan volume decisions, respectively. An average marginal 
effect is an estimate of a population-averaged marginal effect. When comparing the truncated 




the truncated regression model disappear, but there are only two covariates influence the 
decision of loan volume in a same way from the decision of loan approval. Hence, these 
findings reconfirm the advantage of the Cragg model which has already been established 
above, and such advantage is what was expected a priori and supports the idea that the 
assumption of joint decisions on loan approval and loan volume might be restrictive.  
 
2.7. Summary, Conclusions, and Limitations 
 
In this article I have examined how rural households’ characteristics affect lending decisions. I 
develop and estimate an econometric model in which a lender’s decision about the volume of 
a loan is conditional on the decision to approve this loan. Field survey data collected in the 
Province of Shandong in China is used as an example. 
Modeling the volume decision conditional on, rather than jointly with, the lending 
approval decision leads to very different results and implications and thus complements and 
extends previous research. My main empirical findings are as follows. First, I find that rural 
household’s characteristics mainly affect the loan approval decision rather than lending 
volume decision. Second, I find that rural household’s characteristics that increase the 
probability of loan approval do not necessarily increase the volume of approved loan or have 
any effect on the loan volume (see, for example, the covariate land in both decisions). If only 
the coefficients which have statistical significance on both the loan approval and loan volume 
decisions are considered, my empirical results show that those characteristics that increase the 
probability of loan approval often increase the volume. For example, a rural household with a 
well educated household head, which is one of the two covariates which have statistically 
significant effects in all models, is not only beneficial for gaining loan approval but also 
beneficial for meeting the necessities of loan requirements (i.e., without suffering from loan 
constraints). 
Two clear policy implications that emerge from the results are that education and land 
are highly significant in the model estimates. Firstly, the government at all levels in China 
should strive to improve education in rural areas with the aim of increasing farmers’ chances 




Although the education importance has been discussed frequently in the past, it is absolutely 
necessary to emphasize again because of the poor state of education currently existing in rural 
China. In fact, there is an increasingly wide gap of education development between urban and 
rural China due to both objective and subjective factors, such as management, urban-rural 
dualistic economic structure, multi-channel financing policies and development concepts 
behind these. The unbalanced development of education seriously threatens efforts to give all 
people equal development opportunity in China, and the inequity leads to one of the important 
reasons that an undereducated farmer hardly has access to formal loans. Hence, all efforts for 
improving rural education are really deserved. 
Secondly, the central and local governments of China should also protect land rights of 
all farm families with the aim of increasing farmers’ chances for access to formal loans, which 
is beneficial to promote farmers to make long-term investments on farm production. These 
investments substantially boost farm household incomes and will be key to closing the 
income gap between Chinese cities and rural areas. What is more, secure land rights and 
long-term investments toward farm production can guarantee China’s grain security. In fact, 
for the purpose of feeding its 1.4 billion people, the Chinese government should protect land 
rights so as to ensure sufficient arable land, and also to prevent these lands from being 
converted to nonagricultural uses simultaneously.  
Note, however, that the data used in the study needs to be viewed and acknowledged in 
light of its limitations. All respondent rural household characteristics were gathered after the 
five-year period in which loans were granted, but the initial decision to approve the first loan 
was made on the basis of the rural households’ characteristics at the beginning of the five-year 
period. The fact that a rural household did or did not receive a loan likely affected the 
development of at least some of the rural household’s characteristics. There are many 
variables that were collected in the survey that I would like to use because they are clearly 
related to loans, such as the number of laborers for farm production and the number of 
laborers for non-farm production in survey period, but that I cannot use because they are 
endogenous for my partial studies. Data limitations caused a lack of enough independent 
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ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF RURAL HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 





Formal loans from financial institutions continue to play an important role in approaches to 
serve increased agricultural production and improve the living standards of rural households 
around the developing world, both in policy, academic discussions, and in practice. However, 
with economic development and continuous efforts to improve rural financial markets in 
developing countries, especially in rural China, loan demand has become increasingly 
complex and in many cases involves more frequent borrowing. For example, in the data 
analyzed for this study, 32 percent of all households who were granted loans by financial 
institutions received two or more loans over the five-year period. What is more, the number of 
lending approvals over this period reflects cumulative results of individual lending decision 
(approval or non-approval) for every borrower. In China, a variety of formal financial 
institutions can share potential and current clients’ credit information with each other due to 
the development of computers and digital data storage. If a borrower who has received a loan 
before wants a new formal loan, then a lender can easily check his/her credit record by using 
shareware data among a variety of lenders to determine whether to grant him/her a loan. If a 
borrower cannot repay his/her last loan, then no lender will approve his/her new application. 
Hence, for simplicity, the study does not discriminate among the variety types of lenders. 
Additionally, the lending number links a close relationship with the borrower’s credit scoring 
because a new loan approval depends on the borrower’s creditworthiness in the past.  
Considering how important household characteristics (i.e., main components of the 
borrowers’ credit scoring) are for justifying lending approval, exploring which household 
characteristics affect the number of lending approvals over a period of years deserves more 




Past research has mainly focused on five aspects of agricultural lending. The first aspect 
deals with the testing of credit scoring or risk models of the lending decision. Bauer and 
Jordan(1971), Johnson and Hagan (1973), Dunn and Frey (1976), Hardy and Weed (1980), 
Barry et al. (1981), Thomas (2000), Zech and Pederson (2004), and Katchova and Barry 
(2005) devise and examine such models which are used to evaluate relative financial and 
personal characteristics of borrowers and estimate loan requirements and potential risks for 
lenders in order to help lenders decide whether or not to grant a loan to applicants. The second 
aspect addresses the agricultural lending decision process. Stover et al. (1985), Featherstone et 
al. (2007) and Olagunju (2010) examine the agricultural loan decision process and analyze the 
factors from the perspective of the individual loan officer or financial institution. The third 
aspect addresses how internal and external characteristics of financial institutions themselves 
affect agricultural lending, Studies such as Mazzocco (1991), Bard et al. (2000), and 
Ahrendsen (2003) are representative of this branch of the literature. The fourth aspect 
explores the relationship between the informal and formal lending sectors in developing 
countries. For example, Turvey and Kong (2010), Guirkinger (2006), and Ghate (1992) 
examine the relationship between informal and formal lending in China, Peru, and Asian 
countries, respectively. The fifth aspect models the role of the informal and formal credit 
sectors (lenders) in developing countries. Boucher and Guirkinger (2007) and Boucher et al. 
(2008) show that asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers can oblige formal 
lenders to rely on collateral to solve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems inherent 
in credit transactions. 
While the past literature provides many insights into formal lending, one important 
aspect of lending decision-making practices has received very little attention to date: how do 
rural household characteristics affect the number of loans over a period of years? This article 
attempts to answer this question to broaden and deepen the previous research on lending 
decisions. 
In theory, a borrower could apply for a loan an unlimited number of times over a period 
of years on the basis of protection laws for consumers’ rights and interests. Correspondingly, a 
lender has to respond to every loan application to determine whether to lend to a borrower or 




can be calculated by adding up every lending decision related to whether a loan application 
was approved. For example, assume a borrower submits three loan applications to a lender 
over a period of years, if his/her applications are all rejected, then the number of his/her 
lending approval is a zero outcome over the period, while if he/she gets lending approval 
twice, then the outcome is two. Correspondingly, as far as all borrowers are concerned, the 
observed number of lending approvals from all borrowers can be divided into two categories 
as a whole: zero lending outcome and positive integral lending outcome (≥1). The zero 
outcomes are interpreted as a loan rejection which are all loan applications are rejected by (a) 
lender(s) and positive integral outcomes are treated as loan approval, even if there are partial 
loan applications approved during the specified period. 
These binary response values of lending approval over a period of years cannot be 
modeled using logistic regression or probit analysis, but they can be modeled using 
complementary log-log binominal models. This study’s contribution to the literature, therefore, 
is modeling the number of lending approvals that were sequentially made by lenders over a 
five-year period, and comparing specific borrowers’ loan applications during the same period. 
To sum up, the primary goal of this article is to use a complementary log-log binominal 
econometric model to investigate how household characteristics affect the number of lending 
approvals over a period of five years.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section 2 I briefly 
introduce some background information of formal loan in rural China. In section 3 I develop a 
theoretical framework to illustrate decisions of formal loan lending over a period of years. In 
section 4 I present and estimate the complementary log-log binominal model. In section 5 I 




3.2.1. A Brief Introduction of Rural Formal Finance in China 
 
China’s financial system has undergone a series of reforms since the mid-1990’s with the aim 




system in China mainly consists of the Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC), the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) and the Postal 
Savings Bank of China (PSBC). The ABC generally loans to agricultural enterprises, rural 
cooperatives, and village organizations, but usually not to individual rural households. The 
PSBC is the only depository financial institution. Among these four main institutions, “more 
than 80 percent of formal agricultural loans in China are made by the country’s 30,000-plus 
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs)” (Gale and Collender, 2006). In other words, RCCs 
“currently play an overriding role in the rural financial system in China” (Guo and Jia, 2009). 
Additionally, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) regulate all four of these financial institutions.  
Nowadays, with the development of computer technology, all formal financial 
institutions have built a client credit history record network throughout all the institutions in 
the country. In other words, as long as any applicant starts his/her loan application, that 
information will be stored, traced, recorded, and retrieved any time by any formal financial 
institution. Hence, different lenders are able to exchange information about the 
creditworthiness of a borrower through such a network, and the same lender can learn about 
the borrower’s performance over time and develop trust in the future.  
 
3.2.2. Trends in Agricultural Lending in Recent Decades  
 
Figures 1 and 2 below respectively show the balance of agricultural loans for the whole 
country and the Shandong Province of China from 1979 to 2009.  
As shown in the Figures, the balance of agricultural loans in the whole country and the 
Province of Shandong increased very slowly and gently during the first 16 years from 
1979-1995. The relative shares of agricultural loans as a proportion of total loans fluctuated 
within a relatively broad brand and displays a rough downtrend as agriculture’s share of total 
GDP declined. However, the balance of agricultural loans for the whole country and the 
Province of Shandong increased during the 1996-2009 period. The agricultural loan balance 
of the whole country and the Shandong Province respectively reached the equivalent of 




Yuan since 1996, respectively. In 2009, the agricultural share of all loans for the entire 
country and the Province of Shandong respectively was 5% and 11%, a 2 and 4 
percentage-point increase from 1996, respectively. Since Shandong Province is one of China’s 
most prosperous agricultural regions, it is not unusual that the agricultural share of all loans is 
higher than the average level of the whole country since the mid-1990s, when the reform of 
the banking system started to commercialize and modernize (see Figures 1 and 2). Hence, 
Shandong province provides an interesting setting for studying formal loan lending practices 



























































































Agricultural share of all loans (China,the whole country, left axis)
Agricultural Loan Balance (China,the whole country, right axis)
 
Fig.1. Agricultural Loan Balance, the Whole Country of China, Yearly, 1979-2009 





























































































































Agricultural share of all loans (China, Shandong Province, left axis)
Agricultural loan balance (China, Shandong Province,right axis)
 
Fig.2. Agricultural Loan Balance, Shandong Province of China, Yearly,1979-2009 
Source: Shandong Province Statistical Yearbook, China (Various Issues) 
 
3.3. Theoretical Framework 
 




complete failure of these markets (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). Such loan constraints are 
especially likely to arise under the conditions prevailing in developing countries (see, for 
example, Conning and Udry, 2005). I consider three situations for the number of lending 
approval(s) for all loan application(s) over a period of years: full approval, part approval, and 
rejection. A household experiences full approval if its desired number of loan application(s) 
over a period of years is/are approved in full by (a) lending institution(s). If its desired 
number of loan application(s) over a period of years is/are completely refused, the household 
suffered from loan constraints. In between these two situations, I refer to partial approval if 
it’s desired number of loan application(s) over a period of years is/are partially approved.  
In Figure 3 I assume that there are some underlying indicators which affect the number 
of lending approvals over a period of years as opposed to the number of loan applications in 
the same time, and there is a distribution of these indicators across all applicants. I call this 
indicator the applicant’s “liquidity condition”, which is based on his or her qualitative and 
quantitative characteristics. Each applicant’s liquidity condition is main determinant to affect 
his or her final number of lending approval over a period of years. Above an upper liquidity 
condition threshold, the number of lending approval from complete full loan approval exceeds 
that from partial loan approval or rejection. Below a lower liquidity condition threshold, 
rejection takes place. In between these thresholds, the number of lending approval from 









This study proposes a theoretical model for looking at formal lending approvals over a 







Fig.3. The Number of Lending Approvals 




rural household j . If the rural household submits (a) loan application(s) K ( K =1,2,…N, and 
N is a positive integer.) within a period of years, financial institutions have to decide whether 
to approve all application(s) or not, therefore K suffers either non-lending approval (all loan 
rejection) or lending approval (at least one time loan approval). 
Assume a financial institution i  maximizes the expected utility of profits during a 
period of years: 
 

























C is a lender i ’s lending decision for a borrower sj' K th loan application. If 
approval is chosen, then
Kj
C =1; otherwise 
Kj
C =0.  When the K th loan application is 
approved, then the optimal volume in the lending practice (
Kj
α ) is chosen, and the interest 
rate (
Kj
R ) and the term of loan (
Kj
T ) are also determined.  
KKK jjj
TRα  is the expected 
proceeds for the K th loan approved by a lender, vjKb is the possible expenditures or losses for 
the K th lending decision (non-lending approval or lending approval) such as the costs of 
screening a loan application, fjKb is the necessary cost of the lending decision (non-lending 
approval or lending approval) such as the salary of loan officers1.  
Although any borrower can submit unlimited loan applications, the decision of lending 
approval made by a lender is done sequentially, namely, if a borrower applies for a second 
loan, and if he/she performed well on the first loan, then the lender will be more likely to 
approve the second and additional loans. In other words, only after repaying past loan in due 
time will a borrower submit his/her new loan application and have high possibility or 
probability to get loan approval from the lender. Therefore, as far as a borrower ( j ) is  
1 In practice, for the collateral which is used for a loan application, the market value of pledged asset P usually equals or 
exceeds the loan amount and its interest profits, i.e., RTP αα +≥ . However, for simplicity, I assume that 
RTP αα += so that function (1) is feasible. In addition, for parsimony, I omit the possible proceeds from the fees of a 
loan application paid by applicants in all theoretical models because such proceeds are usually very small even if they 




concerned, his/her total number of loan approvals’ times H ( H = 0,1,2,… K ) over a period 
of years does not always equal his/her total number of loan applications’ times ( K ) over the 
same time, namely, KH ≤≤0 . Since we can observe the total number of lending approval 
over a period of years for any borrower j , hence, as to all borrowers ( Njjj 21, ), we can 
interpret H =0 as non-approval of lending if all applications of a borrower ),2,1( Niji =  
over a period of years are not approved by lenders, and treat H =1,2,… K as lending approval 
if all of ij ’s applications are partially or fully approved by a lender in the specified period. 
What is more, within a period of years, whether a lender has lent to a specific borrower ( jC ), 
and if the lending approval is chosen at least once ( jC =1, i.e., part or full loan application(s) 
is/are approved ( KH ≤≤1 )), then function (1) can be further described for a binary 
framework which views the intertemporal nature of the lending approval process as a whole 
and for the purpose of this empirical estimation as follows: 
 





























K bbbB += is the possible total expenditure or loss for all of a specific 






K bbbB += , 
which are the necessary total cost for all j ’s loan applications’ censoring work over a period 
of years. 
HHH jjj
TRα  is the expected proceeds for the H th loan approved by a lender, herein, 
the proceeds from the loan application fees that all applicants must pay is omitted. 
In function (2), jC =0 indicates non-lending approval (i.e., all of a borrower’s loan 
applications are not approved by (a) lender(s) over a period of years) and is associated with 
the first term in the discrete maximization operation. jC =1 indicates lending approval (i.e., a 
borrower’s part or full loan applications are approved by (a) lender(s)) and is associated with 




expected proceeds and covering the costs associated with the lending approval.  
Maximization of expected financial institution utility yields expressions related to the 
loan applicant’s ( j ) household characteristics, which can embody the potential ability of 
creating gains for using loans and guaranteeing loan repayment at a due date. Therefore, H  
is related to xj, a set of observable rural household’s characteristics such as the education level 
of the household head, land size, etc. Formally, ),( HjHH xgH εβ ′= , where  Hβ ′  is a vector 
of parameters, and Hε captures unmeasured factors related to formal loan lending.  
 
3.4. Econometric Methods 
 
In the empirical models of the binary outcome of lending approval over a period of years, the 
observed dependent variable, the total number of lending approval for every borrower during 
a time interval (e.g., five years), is a non-negative integer. Therefore, the total number of 
lending approval for every borrower as a whole takes on two values, zero or a positive integer. 
The value of zero denotes a non-lending approval ( 0=jC ), and the value of positive integers 
denotes a lending approval (full or part) ( 1=jC ). The model follows:  
 
( ) ( ) )3(1/1Pr exp jH xjj exC β′−−==  
 
Where the function (3) is called a complementary log-log model (Green, 2011). The 










jH xFInxInFInL ββ  
 







The data used in this paper were collected in Shandong Province (China) in July 2010 by 
face-to-face interviews. 394 rural households were randomly selected from 5 villages in one 
town (Man Zhuang) and one county (Ning Yang). The survey collected detailed information 
on households’ formal borrowing activities over the last 5 years (i.e., from July 2006 to July 
2010) as well as households’ basic characteristics. 
During the survey, respondents identified whether loan applications were approved by 
financial institutions in a five-year period, and the number of loan granted by (a) lender(s). 
The survey information gathered also includes more general quantitative and qualitative rural 
household characteristics that are considered important determinants of formal loan lending. 
Overall, 204 households were eliminated because they did not participate in the survey or did 
not apply for a formal loan during the past five years. This left 190 households that had 
applied for at least one formal loan. Of these, a further 22 households had to be removed since 
the information they provided was incomplete. Of the remaining 168 households that had 
applied for a formal loan in the past five years, 85 were approved by financial institutions to 
receive a loan. On average, the number of formal loan granted by lenders for the 85 
households over the last five years is 1.49 times.  
Since the period span related to the formal loan survey was five years, a loan for an 
individual respondent household might be disbursed by a financial institution to outside of the 
period studied. For the purpose of achieving accurate information, the survey collected 
current respondent household information within the survey period, namely, a retrospective 
survey related to respondent’s historical household information was not conducted because 
many of those randomized respondents, especially when they are not household heads, rarely 
know the full households’ information history. For the sake of developing the empirical 
analysis, however, it is thus very important to pick appropriate covariates from the collected 
information. A few of the covariates, which not only represent socioeconomic characteristics 
of rural households but also are exogenous, are hypothesized to be relevant in the loan 
approval and loan volume decisions. These include zero-one indicators for whether the 




does not always refer to those professional skills that need professional training and study, 
some simple physical labor jobs, such as sanitation worker, are viewed as non-farm skill as 
well. Some respondents might say that the head of his or her household has no non-farm skill, 
the plausible reason is either that the household head is born with a physical disability or that 
the household head is too old for farm work (aged over 65 years old). Not many household 
heads in rural China absolutely did not have non-farm skill, of course. Therefore, these two 
zero-one indicators are appropriate for the study and are exogenous for the number of lending 
approvals analysis. 
The average age of a household head over a period of years reflects that household’s 
structure. Household structures was divided into four main types on the basis of age: (1) 
young household, defined as a household head’s age between 18 and 35 years old; 
(2)middle-aged household, defined as a household head’ age between 36 and 50 years old; 
(3)elderly household, defined as a household head’s age between 51 and 65 years old; and 
(4)very elderly household, defined as a household head aged 66 years old or over. Hence, 
every responding household can be easily determined on the basis of the division of 
household structure for the empirical analysis. 
In China, farmland is still owned and controlled by the state and leased to farmers. 
Farmers can’t sell it, and they can’t use it for collateral on a loan. In 1997, rural households 
were allowed to sign a long-term lease of 30 years for the right to work a plot, which was 
allocated according to shares in village populations. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the 
amount of farm land of every respondent household could not change from 2006 to 2010 due 
to undated signed leases in the survey area. Therefore, the covariate land is exogenous and 
introduced into the analysis.  
The household head’s education level was also considered exogenous because almost no 
household heads in rural China underwent education-change over the study period, hence, it 
can also be introduced into the empirical analysis. Additionally, the covariate asset, which is 
household total asset value, is also used in the analysis. Overall, all dependent variables and 







Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. Obs. 
Dependent Variable     
Number Number of lending approvals’ times over the 
last five years 
0.76 0.96 168 
  Zero: 0  0 0 83 
                Positive Integer: 1.49 0.85 85 
          1    58 
          2    16 
          3   8 
          4   2 
          5   1 
Covariates     
Gender Whether the household head is female 
(female=1, male=0) 
0.05 0.21 168 
YongHH 1 if household head’s age is between 18 and 35 
years old; otherwise=0 
0.08 0.27 168 
MiddleHH 1 if household head’s age is between 36 and 50 
years old; otherwise=0 
0.57 0.50 168 
ElderHH 1 if household head’s age is between 51 and 65 
years old; otherwise=0 
0.32 0.47 168 
Education Household head’s education level in years 8.93 3.17 168 
Nonfarmskill Whether household head has non-farm skill 
(yes=1, non=0) 
0.19 0.39 168 
Land Amount of farm land in Mu (1 Mu≈0.16 Acre) 3.05 3.59 168 
 
Asset Household total asset value in Yuan 
(thousands)2 including house, land, farm 
machine, etc. 
199.74 180.65 168 
     
 
3.6. Results and Discussion 
 
The model specification outlined above was estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 
Results of the complementary log-log model for the number of lending approval over the 
five-year period are given in Table 2. Both parameter estimates and average marginal effects 










Complementary log-log Binominal Model analysis results for the number 






 N=168 N=168 
Covariates 



































LR chi2(7)=113.40***  
Log Likelihood=-59.7346  
  
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively;  
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients, AME values, and their corresponding  
standard error obtained by margins command in Stata. 
 
The results of the complementary log-log binominal model indicate that households with a 
head who has a higher education level and non-farm labor skills are more likely to be 
approved for a loan. Higher education increases productivity so that more value can be 
created, and having non-farm labor skill means more income sources. Thus, these two 
characteristics have strong positive effects on the probability of loan approval (5% 
significance level). 
As can be seen in column 2 of Table 2, the covariate land has a statistically significant 
positive effect (1% significance level) on the loan approval decision as well. More land means 
that loan applicants’ potential productivity or rent proceeds can be increased; hence, it is one 




A household’s total asset value is often used by lenders to determine the initial and/or 
ongoing loan amount, and/or compliance with one or more debt covenants because they are 
often included in the borrowing base3. Household assets are often considered as collateral, so 
it is not surprising that they are associated with increased probability of lending approval. 
However, the significance level of variable asset is only 1%, and its coefficient is also very 
small. 
In addition, column 3 of Table 2 show the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the 
probability of the number of lending approvals. An average marginal effect is an estimate of a 
population-averaged marginal effect. The AMEs’ results of the complementary log-log model 
are unanimous to its counterpart coefficients with the same sign and statistical significance, 
hence, for parsimony, they are not discussed in the paper. 
 
3.7. Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research Direction 
 
This article has examined how rural households’ characteristics affect the number of lending 
approvals over a period of years. Field survey data collected in the Province of Shandong, 
China is used as the sample. 
Modeling the number of lending approvals over a five-year period leads to a few 
interesting results and implications and thus complements and extends previous research. The 
main empirical findings are that household head’s education level and non-farm production 
skills, the amount of farm land，and the household’s total asset value have statistically 
significant effects in the model. These three factors are beneficial for borrowers to gain loan 
approval. 
Two clear policy implications that emerge from the results are that education and land 
are highly significant in the model estimates. Firstly, the government at all levels in China 
should strive to improve education in rural areas with the aim of increasing farmers’ chances 
for access to formal loans which can lead them to higher productivity and household welfare. 
Although the education importance has been discussed frequently in the past, it is absolutely  
 
3 The borrowing base is the value assigned to a collection of a borrower’s assets, and its calculation is contractually 




necessary to emphasize again because of the poor state of education currently existing in rural 
China. In fact, there is an increasingly wide gap of education development between urban and 
rural China due to both objective and subjective factors, such as management, urban-rural 
dualistic economic structure, multi-channel financing policies and development concepts 
behind these. The unbalanced development of education seriously threatens efforts to give all 
people equal development opportunity in China, and the inequity leads to one of the important 
reasons that an undereducated farmer hardly has access to formal loans. Hence, all efforts for 
improving rural education are really deserved. 
Secondly, the central and local governments of China should also protect land rights of 
all farm families with the aim of increasing farmers’ chances for access to formal loans, which 
is beneficial to promote farmers to make long-term investments on farm production. These 
investments substantially boost farm household incomes and will be key to closing the 
income gap between Chinese cities and rural areas. What is more, secure land rights and 
long-term investments toward farm production can guarantee China’s grain security. In fact, 
for the purpose of feeding its 1.4 billion people, the Chinese government should protect land 
rights so as to ensure sufficient arable land, and also to prevent these lands from being 
converted to nonagricultural uses simultaneously. 
Although some contributions from this study are particularly applicable to rural finance, 
the results of this study also need to be viewed and acknowledged in lights of its limitations. 
All respondent rural households’ characteristics were asked after the five-year period in which 
loans were granted. But the initial decision to approve the first loan was made on the basis of 
the rural households’ characteristics at the beginning of the five-year period. The fact that a 
rural household did or did not receive a loan likely has affected the development of that rural 
household’s characteristics. As far as a covariate asset is concerned, a household’s assets will 
tend to be higher if a household has been able to borrow. Hence, the covariate asset used in 
this article is suspected of endogeneity, and the findings in this article might be biased and 
inconsistent.  
Considering the suspect covariate (i.e., asset), future research should first use a Hausman 
test to confirm whether the covariate is endogenous. If the test proves endogeneity, then a 
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WHO FEELS THAT INTEREST RATES ON FORMAL LOANS ARE TOO HIGH IN 






The provision of formal loans to potential borrowers in the rural areas of developing countries 
is hampered by high transaction costs that stem from small loan sizes, lack of assets that are 
suitable as collateral, and covariate risks (Petrick and Latruffe, 2005). These factors increase 
the costs of formal lending and will, all other things being equal, result in increased interest 
rates. In China’s rural financial market, where the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) 
dominate the markets for lending and deposit services (Guo and Jia, 2009), their monopoly 
position might further inflate interest rates. High interest rates will lead to partial or full 
exclusion of potential borrowers from formal financial systems, forcing them to rely on 
meager self-finances, interpersonal lending or illegal usury and thus limiting their ability to 
actively participate in and benefit from the economic development process (Li et al., 2011).  
The determination and implications of interest rates have been studied from many 
different angles. Although most studies focus on macro finance (e.g. Duffee, 2002; Jarrow et 
al., 2007), some studies address farm loans and the field of micro finance. Featherstone et al. 
(1993) explore the relationship between interest rates in the national money market and 
interest rates on farm loans. Interest rate determination in underdeveloped rural areas has been 
studied by, for example, Bottomley (1975) and Petrick and Latruffe (2005). A large-scale field 
experiment carried out in South Africa by Karlan and Zinman (2008) in order to estimate 
interest rate elasticities of demand for credit, shows that the demand curves are downward 
sloping and steeper for interest rate increases relative to the lender’s standard rates. Other 
related studies include Salazar et al. (2010), Attanasio et al. (2008), Dehejia et al. (2005), 
Alessie et al. (2005), Gross et al. (2002), etc. Castro and Teixeira (2006) study the effects of 




Mohane et al. (2002) analyze the effects of interest rate ceilings on the micro lending market 
in South Africa. Factors affecting the interest rate distribution for the Farm Credit System’s 
direct lending associations in the US are studied by Dodson and Duncan (1998).  
One aspect of interest rates in rural finance that has not received attention to date 
concerns the attitudes of potential formal loan clients towards interest rate levels. As we 
describe below, 22 percent of the respondents in the sample of Chinese farmers that we 
analyze believe that interest rates on formal loans are too high. If this share is representative 
of China as a whole, as many as 100 million rural farmers feel that interest rates on formal 
loans are too high and are therefore partially or fully excluded from formal finance.  
What are the typical characteristics of these potential rural borrowers and what 
distinguishes them from borrowers who are satisfied with interest rate levels? Economic 
modeling, policy and practice suggest that interest rate levels are critically related to the 
functioning of loan markets (Karlan and Zinman, 2008). Understanding the attitude of 
potential formal borrowers in rural areas, on the level of lending rates can thus respond to 
help policymakers design optimal financial services, improve the rural financial structure, and 
thus to foster rural economic growth. 
The objective of this article is therefore to determine what socio-economic characteristics 
influence some potential borrowers’ attitudes towards high interest rates recognition on formal 
loans. To pursue the objective we analyze field survey data from Shandong Province in China 
using a method proposed by van de Ven and van Praag that allows us to correct for systematic 
non-response in a probit-type equation. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In 
section 2 we provide some background information on formal financial institutions and 
interest rates in rural China. In section 3 we describe the data we employ. In sections 4 and 5, 
a conceptual framework and the proposed estimation technique, respectively, are presented. 




Although China’s financial system has undergone a series of reforms since the mid-1990’s 




rural financial market of China is superficially similar to that of many developing countries. 
“Formal credit programs are highly centralized, private lending is strictly regulated and often 
considered illegal, and credit rationing is prevalent”(Cheng and Xu, 2004; Jia et al., 2007; 
Guo and Jia, 2009). China’s rural finance consists of formal, semi-formal, and informal 
finances (Guo and Jia, 2009). Rural semi-formal finance refers to microcredit pilots and 
projects initiated by government agencies or NGOs which just operate in small regions of 
individual provinces in China. Rural informal finance refers to either interpersonal lending, 
which depends on personal relationship, or illegal usury, which usually charges borrowers 
exorbitant interest rates. Compared with these alternatives, rural formal finance in China 
operates with the advantages of ample loan supply and legal status in China’s rural financial 
market. Hence, semi-formal finance and informal finance are poor substitutes for formal 
finance in rural China1. 
 
4.2.1. Formal Financial Institutions and Interest Rates in Rural China 
 
The current rural formal financial system in China mainly consists of the Rural Credit 
Cooperative (RCC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China (ADBC) and the Postal Savings Bank of China (PSBC). All four of these 
institutions are regulated by the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission and the People's 
Bank of China (PBOC). The ABC lends to agricultural enterprises, rural cooperatives, and 
village organizations, but only rarely to individual rural households. The PSBC is the 
deposit-only financial institution. Overall, “more than 80 percent of formal agricultural loans 
in China are made by the country’s 30,000-plus Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs)”(Gale and 
Collender, 2006). Thus, RCCs play an dominant role in the loan disbursement and deposit 
systems in rural China (Guo and Jia, 2009), and most formal borrowers in rural areas deal 
exclusively with their local RCC.  
Prior to the initiation of financial reforms in 1997, the Chinese government fixed interest 
rates for both formal financial institution deposits and loans. Following 1997, interest rates on 
 
1 As pointed out by Feder et al. (1990,pp:1152-1153), “…informal credit is not a good substitute for formal credit due to 




loans were gradually liberalized and formal financial institutions were permitted to determine 
the interest rate for a particular loan within a given range of a benchmark interest rates set by 
the PBOC (Martin, 2012). Although the PBOC eliminated the ceiling on interest rates in the 
course of the reform process, it continued to set a benchmark interest rate. According to 
current Chinese law and regulation, “bank lending rates can be no less than 90% of the 
benchmark rate set by the PBOC, with no upward limit” (Martin, 2012). As a result, the 
formal financial institutions currently have considerable latitude to set interest rates on loans, 
and the PBOC benchmark rates and permissible bands have only a limited effect on interest 
rates. Therefore, it is not surprising that some potential formal borrowers in China’s rural 
areas face interest rates that they feel are too high. In the data that we analyze below, those 
potential borrowers who stated that the current interest rate offered by formal institutions is 
too high also stated that the average maximum annual interest rate that they would accept was 
about 6 percent, while the average annual lending interest rate offered by formal institutions 
was about 7 percent.  
 
4.2.2. Trends in Agricultural Lending in Recent Decades 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the annual cumulative loan disbursement and the share of agriculture in 
all formal lending for China as a whole and for Shandong Province, respectively, from 1979 
to 2009. As shown in the Figures, the balance of agricultural loans in China and Shandong 
Province increased slowly during the first 16 years from 1979-1995. The relative shares of 
agricultural loans as a proportion of total loans fluctuated within a relatively broad brand and 
displayed a slight downtrend as agriculture’s share of total GDP declined. However, the 
balance of agricultural loans increased strongly during the 1996-2009 period both in China as 
a whole and in Shandong province, reaching 21,623 billion Yuan (RMB) and 296 billion Yuan 
respectively in 20092. In respectively, up 2 and 4 percentage points from 1996. Since 
Shandong Province is one of China’s most prosperous agricultural regions, it is not unusual 
that the agricultural share of all loans is higher there than in China as a whole. 
 






























































































Agricultural share of all loans (China,the whole country, left axis)
Agricultural Loan Balance (China,the whole country, right axis)
 
Fig.1. Agricultural Loan Balance, the Whole Country of China, Yearly, 1979-2009 





























































































































Agricultural share of all loans (China, Shandong Province, left axis)
Agricultural loan balance (China, Shandong Province,right axis)
 
Fig.2. Agricultural Loan Balance, Shandong Province of China, Yearly,1979-2009 




The data used in this paper were collected in Shandong Province (China) in July 2010. 394 
rural households were randomly selected from 5 villages in one town (Man Zhuang) and one 
county (Ning Yang), but 104 selected respondents did not wish to participate, leaving a 
sample size of 290. The survey collected detailed information on households’ formal 
borrowing activities over the last 5 years (i.e., from July 2006 to July 2010) as well as 
households’ basic demographic and economic characteristics. 
For the purposes of this study, the core question in the survey questionnaire reads as 
follows3: “Given that you wish to borrow from a formal financial institution, and comparing  
 





the interest rate set by the formal institution with the maximum interest rate that you would 
accept, do you feel that the interest rate set by the formal institution is: A) too high; B) too 
low; C) fair?”. After compiling the responses to this question, it was found that only 25 
respondents who chose answer “B”. Thus, the responses can be mainly divided into two 
categories: too high and fair. In the paper, we mainly shed light on those respondents who 
answered “A” because they most likely shy away from formal loan market because of interest 
rates on formal loan set by the lenders. Since other financing channels such as interpersonal 
lending are not good substitutions for formal financing under current situation of China’ rural 
financial market and consequently, some potential borrowers most likely cannot meet their 
financial needs if they are also excluded from formal loan. One of research goals on rural 
finance in developing countries thus focuses on finding out socio-economic characteristics of 
some borrowers who suffer from formal loan constraints so as to design optimal policy to help 
them to access to formal loan. Moreover, some respondents who answered “B” and “C” most 
likely feel easy or free when they want to borrow from formal financial institutions so that we 
can pay little attention to them. In consequence, in the following we consider responses “B” 
and “C” together in a new category － not too high. Such a new division on respondents’ 
attitudes towards interest rates on formal loan (i.e., too high or not too high) allows us to 
clearly and better concentrate our core research, namely, who feels that interest rates on 
formal loans are too high in rural financial markets?.  
Although there was no way to know exactly why 104 respondents abstained from the 
survey, their non-participation resulted in non-responses of all survey questions related to 
rural finance and consequently, we miss those respondents’ information so that they cannot be 
selected to be in our sample. These non-responses, which are called unit non-responses by 
Berinsky (2005), are random because these missing observations are random in the context of 
survey research. As a result, such distortions are inconsequential in the aggregate (Berinsky, 
2005), and can be excluded from the survey population without leading to sample bias. Of the 
290 respondents who participated, 184 respondents answered the core question. Of these, 64 
respondents, or 22 percent of the complete sample of 290, stated that the formal interest rate is 
too high (response "A"). 106 respondents did not answer the core question, but did answer 




in entire survey. As to such non-responses, there might be a few reasons for explanation such 
as these respondents might lack sufficient information on interest rates on formal loan, 
however, whatever the reason may be, their non-responses are viewed as intentional. Hence, 
these non-responses, which are called item non-responses by Berinsky (2005), are not random. 
We cannot exclude these non-responses from the sample without incurring the risk of 
compositional biases in potential borrowers’ attitudes towards interest rates on formal loans 
(Berinsky, 2005). 
Other questions in the survey included the following: “Is your main cash income from 
farm work? A) Yes; B) No” “Who is your preferred lender when you want to borrow money? 
A) relatives or friends; B) formal financial institutions; C) usury”; and “Who did you mainly 
borrow from in the past? A) relatives or friends; B) formal financial institutions; C) usury”. 
Only one respondent in our survey admitted that not only his preferred lender but also his past 
main source of loans was usury. One other respondent stated that usury was his preferred 
source of loans, but not his main source in the past. Usury rates will presumably be much 
higher than formal rates, so anyone accustomed to usury will presumably find formal rates to 
be “not too high”. For brevity and convenience, we simply drop the two cases in which usury 
was stated, and leaving these two observations out of the study does not significantly alter the 
results. Hence, we finally leave the sample size of 288 for our analysis. In addition, the 
answers choices related to the questions of “Who is your preferred lender when you want to 
borrow money?” and “Who did you mainly borrow from in the past?” become two: A) 
relatives or friends and B) formal financial institutions.  
Responses to the questions discussed above are coded into the following variables as 
follows: attitude equals 1 if the respondent states that interest rates on formal loans are too 
high, and 0 otherwise; income equals 1 if the respondent’s cash income is mainly from farm 
work, and 0 otherwise; prefer equals 1 if the respondent’s first borrowing source is “relatives 
or friends”, and 0 otherwise; and source equals 1 if the respondent’s main source of loans in 
the past was “relatives or friends”, and 0 otherwise. In addition, the variable response equals 1 
if the respondent answered the core question, and 0 otherwise. Personal characteristics such as 
age and gender are also included in our analysis, whereby gender equals zero for male 




categories from “never went to school” (the lowest level) to “completed college or university” 
(the highest). To avoid multicollinearity in the empirical analysis, we use dummy variables for 
the first six of these attainment levels (edu1 through edu6). The respondent’s family’s total 
assets (assets), the number of laborers (labor), and the number of household members under 
12 years of age and aged 65 or over (oldchild) are also included. The definitions, means and 
standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Variable definition and sample statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. Obs. 
Dependent Variable    
response 
Answering the core question (i.e., Given that you 
wish to borrow from a formal financial institution, 
and comparing the interest rate set by the formal 
institution with the maximum interest rate that you 
would accept, do you feel that the interest rate set by 
the formal institution?) =1; otherwise=0 
0.63 0.48 288 
attitude Feel that interest rates on formal loans are too high=1; otherwise=0 0.35 0.48 182 
Independent Variable 
age Respondent’s age in years 47.68 11.32 288 
gender Whether the respondent is female (male=0, female=1) 0.50 0.50 288 
educational 
attainment 
Set of dummy variables with the reference category 
"completed college or university"   288 
edu1 1 if respondent never went to school; otherwise=0 0.05 0.21 288 
edu2 1 if respondent attained some elementary school; 
otherwise=0 0.10 0.31 288 
edu3 1 if respondent completed elementary school; 
otherwise=0 0.15 0.36 288 
edu4 1 if respondent attained some high school; 
otherwise=0 0.14 0.35 288 
edu5 1 if respondent completed high school; otherwise=0 0.42 0.49 288 
edu6 1 if respondent attended some university or college; 
otherwise=0 0.13 0.33 288 
labor The number of family laborers  2.72 1.48 288 
oldchild The number of family members aged under 12 or 
over 65 years 1.41 1.31 288 
income 1 if main cash income comes from farm work; otherwise=0 0.49 0.50 288 
prefer 1 if preferred source of loans is relatives or friends; 
otherwise=0 0.85 0.35 288 
source 1 if main source of loans in past was relatives or 
friends; otherwise=0 0.73 0.44 288 
asset Total asset value of household including house, 
farm machine, other fixed assets, etc. (in thousand 
Yuan) 






4.4. Conceptual framework 
 
Our rural finance survey was designed to assess potential formal loan borrowers’ attitudes 
towards interest rates. Attitude is described or defined as “a learned predisposition to respond 
in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object”(Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975). Considering a truth that potential borrowers usually plan to use formal 
loans for a purpose of either production or consumption and consequently, it is a underlying 
idea that these potential borrowers each have a potential investment project in mind, and that 
the rates of return of these investments follow some distribution, with some rates of return 
being higher than the current interest rates, and others being lower or same, and these 
potential borrowers formulating their attitudes correspondingly (i.e. not too high or too high). 
Note, however, that consumption cannot directly create wealth, but potential borrowers who 
plan to borrow for consumption should also look for a proper investment project because they 
have to repay the loan. Therefore, according to law and loan contract, whatever the purpose of 
borrowing may be, potential borrowers each should consider a investment project in mind so 
as to repay loan in due time. 
The use of rate of return of a investment project ( InvestiR ) as a way of relating to an 
attitude towards interest rates on formal loan ( InterestiR ) seems reasonable if potential formal 
loan borrowers who want to choose between two attitudes (i.e., either too high or not). Hence, 
in this paper a respondent's attitude towards the interest rate on formal loans is assumed to 
depend on his or her personal rate difference ( DifiR ) between the interest rate on formal loan 






iR . As far as a respondent’s 
Dif
iR  is concerned, 
Interest
iR can be viewed as 
constant term because it is set by the financial institutions, hence, the respondent’s rate 
difference is absolutely decided by InvestiR , which in turn is influenced by his or her 



































Therefore, the rate difference is influenced by the respondent's age, gender, and educational 
attainment, the number of laborers in his or her family, and the number of household members 
aged under 12 or over 65 years. Whether or not farming generates the respondent's main cash 
income, and his or her total family’s asset level are also hypothesized to influence the rate 
difference and, by extension, attitude towards interest rates on formal loans.  
 
4.5. Empirical Model 
 




i ε+α=  
where once again DifiR  represents the rate difference to respondent i  of coming to his or 
her attitude towards interest rates on formal loan, iX is a vector of the covariates discussed 
above, and α is a vector of corresponding parameters. i1ε  is assumed to be normally 
distributed, namely, ( )211 ,0~ σε i . 
We cannot actually observe the rate difference DifiR , but we do know whether or not 
the respondent states that the interest rate on formal loans is too high. Thus we have an 
indicator of whether or not 0RDifi ≥  is true (van de Ven and van Praag, 1981). In other 
words, all we observe is the dichotomous variable attitude, which we label iγ  and which 
equals 1 if the respondent states that interest rates are too high, and 0 otherwise. Thus, iγ  is 
given by: 
)4().high too are rates interest(0Rif1













core question but did answer the other questions in the survey (i.e., item non-response). These 
observations, if they are excluded from sample, could not only result in a compositional 
biases (Berinsky, 2005), but also not be used to estimate the coefficients α  in equation (3) 
(van de Ven and van Praag, 1981).  
According to van de Ven and van Praag (1981), item non-response behavior can also be 
analyzed by a means of probit analysis. For each respondent we define the variable response 
iδ  = 1 if all questions related to rural finance have been answered, and iδ  = 0 if all 













where iY  is an unobserved index of response propensity, β a vector of unknown parameters, 
Z a vector of exogenous variables, and i2ε is also assumed to be normally distributed, namely, 
( )222 ,0~ σε i . Specifically, we can view item non-response as respondents’ preferences for 
answering the core question. “It is assumed that preferences represent the formation of an 
individual’s state of mental awareness that primarily reflects an individual’s beliefs and 
perceptions about the objects, which are dynamic in nature and can change significantly over 
time”(Huang, 1996). Thus, it is hypothesized that a respondent’s socio-economic 
characteristics, for example, the variables age, gender, labor, oldchild, income, edu1,…,edu6, 
prefer, source, and asset influence his or her preferences for answering the core question (i.e., 
Z=(age, gender, labor, oldchild, edu1,…,edu6 ,income ,prefer, source, asset, and constant 
term)).  
To sum up, since we only observe attitudes towards interest rates on formal loan for 
those respondents willing to answer the core question first, equations (5a) and (5b) model 
whether the respondent answered the core question and consist of a probit model in the 
preference equation. Moreover, equations (3) and (4) are respondents’ attitudes towards 
interest rates on formal loans and a probit model in the attitude equation. In addition, iδ  in 




who chose to answer the core question. Although equations (3), (4), (5a), and (5b) can be 
estimated independently of the probit procedure, there will be a loss of efficiency unless the 
error terms of the two probit equations are independent (Meng and Schmidt, 1985). More 
importantly, observations for equations (3) and (4) represent a “choice-based” or censored 
sample which could be subjected to potential selectivity bias if estimated separately (Huang, 
1996). Therefore, the appropriate procedure is the joint estimation of equations (3), (4), (5a) 
and (5b) (Meng and Schmidt, 1985).  
Accordingly, following van de Ven and van Pragg (1981), we assume that i1ε  in 
equation (3) and i2ε  in equation (5b) are bivariate standard normally distributed
4 with 
correlation coefficient ρ , the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function 2Φ , and 
cumulative standard normal distribution function Φ .Then, the likelihood [based on eqs. (3), 














where the first 1N observations have 1== ii δγ ( answered all questions and feel that interest 
rates on formal loans are too high), the following 1NN − observations have 0=iγ and iδ =1 
(answered all questions and feel that interest rates on formal loans are not too high), and the 
last NM − observations have 0=iδ (answered all questions except the core question on 
attitudes towards interest rates) (van de Ven and van Praag, 1981). 
 
4.6. Results and Discussion 
 
The probit with sample selection model was estimated using the maximum likelihood method. 
The model specification outlined above was initially estimated using the complete set of 
explanatory variables presented in Table 1. Likelihood Ratio tests were then used to exclude 
 
 
4 Namely, 121 == σσ . The assumption is based on the well-known probit-normalization in order to get by 





explanatory variables which do not improve the fit of the model. In the following we report 
the results of the resulting parsimonious specifications, which just focus on the signs of 
statistically significant findings for each explanatory variable. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the model are presented in Table 2. The 
explanatory variables of different education attainment levels (i.e., edu1,…,edu6 ) were 
excluded from the outcome function with respect to the respondents’ attitude towards high 
interest rates’ recognition on formal loan because they did not improve the fit of the probit 
with sample selection model. A likelihood-ratio test indicates that the null hypothesis that the 
two error terms of probit model with sample selection are uncorrelated (i.e., 0=ρ ) can be 
rejected at the 0.008 significance level, namely, the sum of the log likelihoods from the two 
separate probit models do not equal the log likelihood of the probit model with sample 
selection at the 0.008 significance level.  
The results of the response equation (5a and 5b) (see iδ in table 2) show that respondents 
whose family member have more people aged over 65 and more children under 12 years of 
age, are less likely to answer the core question. A plausible explanation is that more old and 
children people in a family usually means more consumption expenditure than wealth creation. 
Such families may be generally less likely to borrow and therefore will lack the information 
required to answer the core question. Respondents who have lower education attainment level 
(i.e., never went to school or only attained some elementary school) are also less likely to 
answer the core question. The strong negative influence of edu1 and edu2, or this 
phenomenon, might partly be explained by the reduced capability of less educated people to 
fill in the questionnaire. However, since these same respondents did answer the other 
questions in the survey, it may also be an indication that those people rarely borrow money 
from formal financial institutions and were thus unable to answer core question. Interestingly, 
as opposed to some respondents who completed elementary school (i.e., variable edu3), 
respondents who attained some high school (variable edu4) are less likely to answer the core 
question. The negative influence of edu4, or this phenomenon, might partly be explained by 
increased capability of more educated people to mainly raise funds through other financing 




respond the core question.      
As might be expected, those respondents whose past borrowing source is “relatives or 
friends” are less likely to answer the core question. Finally, the finding of a negative and 
significant coefficient associated with the variable prefer is interesting but makes sense 
because those respondents whose preferred source of loans is friends and relatives might 
never access a formal loan, so they cannot give their answer with respect to the core question 
due to relatively poor knowledge of interest rates on formal loans. 
With respect to the attitude equation (3 and 4), the results (see iγ  in table 2) show that 
being female has a significant but negative effect on the likelihood that a respondent will state 
that interest rates on formal loans are too high. This finding might imply that female farmers 
are more confident of using formal loans than males. This phenomenon might be explained by 
the fact that females are more risk-averse than males (see, for example, Fletschner and 
Kenney, 2011; Gockel, 2009; etc.), so that they might efficiently use formal loans if they can 
access the loan. Moreover, results indicate that respondents whose main cash income is 
agriculture are less likely to state that interest rates on formal loans are too high. This finding 
might be explained by the popular large scale financial support for agricultural production 
brought about by agriculture loans with relatively lower using costs in China, for example, a 
well-known policy that government purchases grain without limitations at protective prices 
(i.e., a kind of price subsidy) not only compensates farmers’ all production costs including 
loan costs but also guarantees them a steady increase income. In addition, as might be 
expected, the results suggest that total values about a family’s total asset exert significant but 
opposite influence on the likelihood that a respondent will state that interest rates on formal 
loans are too high. A plausible explanation is that more total assets are beneficial for 
smoothing any possible loan risks and increasing the capability of loan payment, so more 
assets reduce the respondents’ sensitivity to interest rates.  
In order to get some ideas about the relative influence of the attitude towards interest 
rates on formal loans we respectively calculated the marginal effects of the probability 
),1Pr(),1Pr( == ii γδ and )1|1Pr( == ii δγ  with respect to explanatory variables at the 




effects of explanatory variables (columns 3 and 5 in Table 2) have the same sign and 
significance as their related coefficients in the equations (5a) and (3) (columns 2 and 4 in 
Table 2), for parsimony, we therefore just shed light on the latter marginal effect (column 6 in 
Table 2). Column 6 represents the marginal effects for the probability of an attitude towards 
high interest rates on formal loan given a response that a respondent answered the core 
question being observed (i.e., )1|1Pr( == ii δγ ).  
From column 6 in Table 2, the variables gender, income, and asset have significant but 
negative influence on the likelihood that a respondent will state that interest rates on formal 
loan are too high, but the marginal effects with respect to respondent’s family total asset 
values are negligibly due to very small effect. Therefore, the remaining two variables 
(respondents’ gender and whether or not their main cash income is from agriculture) are 
important for setting a proper loan program for financial institutions. Also the level of 
significance of the coefficients of these two variables (statistical significance at 1% level) 
shows their importance. We may conclude that respondents who are female and whose main 
cash income is from agriculture might be top-priority lending objects of formal loans due to 
their opposite attitude with respect to the likelihood that a respondent state that interest rates 
on formal loan are too high. Since these two types of respondents simultaneously indicated 
responses of answering the core question and their attitude towards high interest rates on 
formal loan, thus, the rural formal financial institutions should pay more attention to their 
liquidity demands.  
Moreover, the conditional marginal effects of variable edu1, edu2, prefer, and source 
have significant and positive influence on the likelihood that a respondent will state that 
interest rates are too high. The positive marginal effects from the variable edu1 and edu2 can 
be explained by the fact that relatively lower education attainment levels largely limit those 
respondents’ capability of wealth creation so that they hold an opinion that interest rates on 
formal loans are too high. Combining this with the findings of the response function (column 
2 and 3 in Table 2), it might be concluded those respondents with relatively lower education 
level most likely shied away the formal loan market because they cannot afford interest rates 




question. The positive marginal effect from the variables prefer and source are as expected 
and can be explained by the fact that most loans with zero interest from relatives or friends5 
are more likely appealing so that respondents feel that interest rates on formal loans are too 
high. Combining this with the program with respect to how to attract more farmers into the 
formal loan market, we may conclude that popular agricultural loans are very difficult to 
attract those farmers who have cheap channels to raise funds, so the rural financial institutions 
may provide them other services, such as financial planning, so as to get service yields.  
 
Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and marginal effects of response for answering 
the core question ( iδ ) and attitude towards interest rate on formal loan ( iγ ) equations 
Variable 










age 0.01(0.01) 0.005(0.003) -0.01(0.01) -0.002(0.002) -0.005 (0.003) 
gender 0.02(0.19) 0.009(0.07) -0.47*** 
(0.19) 
-0.14*** (0.05) -0.22*** (0.08) 
labor -0.01(0.06) -0.005(0.02) -0.01(0.06) -0.002(0.02) -0.0004(0.02) 
oldchild -0.17*** (0.07) -0.06*** (0.03) 0.02(0.07) -0.005(0.02) 0.04(0.03) 
income -0.20(0.18) -0.08(0.07) -0.53*** 
(0.19) 
-0.15*** (0.05) -0.20*** (0.07) 






edu1 -1.40** (0.66) -0.50*** (0.17)   0.69*** (0.04) 
edu2 -1.55*** (0.60) -0.55*** (0.15)   0.70*** (0.04) 
edu3 -0.78(0.60) -0.30(0.23)   0.24(0.29) 
edu4 -1.01* (0.61) -0.39* (0.21)   0.38(0.43) 
edu5 -0.71(0.58) -0.27(0.21)   0.15(0.15) 
edu6 -0.77(0.60) -0.30(0.23)   0.24(0.30) 
prefer -0.44*(0.26) -0.15*(0.08)   0.07**(0.03) 
source -0.64*** (0.21) -0.22*** (0.07)   0.10*** (0.03) 
constant 1.78** (0.73)  0.13(0.48)   
Log Likelihood = -272.6067 
LR test of indep. Eqns ( ρ =0): =7.13 
Wald (6) = 13.39**   
Number of Observations = 288   
Note: *,**,***, represents 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level, respectively; standard errors in parentheses. 
Marginal effects is at the same mean value. The appropriate marginal effect for a binary independent 
variable, say, d, would be calculated by taking the difference of estimated probabilities when d increases 
from 0 to 1, namely, Marginal Effect=Pr(d=1)-Pr(d=0) (Greene, 2011). 
 
 
5  Interest rates charged by relatives or friends are often zero or very low in the rural areas of China. Indeed, in our survey, 





4.7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this article we studied respondents’ attitudes towards interest rates on formal loan on the 
basis of their responses of answering all questions in the survey. For an estimation method we 
used a probit model with sample selection which was suggested by van de Ven and van Praag 
(1981). The maximum likelihood estimation that accounts for sample selectivity bias was 
used to analyze the survey data collected for this study. 
Our main conclusion is that respondents’ gender, their main cash income sources, and 
their family’s total asset values have negative influence on the likelihood that a respondent 
will state that interest rates on formal loans are too high. The conditional marginal effects, 
which indicate respondents’ attitudes towards high interest rates on formal loans on the basis 
of their response of answering all survey questions, suggest that respondents’ gender, their 
main cash income sources, relatively lower education attainment levels, and past main 
borrowing source have important influence on the attitudes towards high interest rates on 
formal loans.  
A clear implication is that female clients or clients whose main cash income is from farm 
work deserve to be paid more attention by formal loan lenders due to their negative attitudes 
towards high interest rates recognition on formal loans. If China’s rural formal financial 
institutions can closely combine with the state’s preferential policies which support 
agricultural production and rural economic growth, then they can develop proper loan 
services or programs which are aimed at these two types of clients in rural financial markets. 
In fact, from 2004 to 2009, each year’s China’s No. 1 documents released by the central 
government, elaborating on the biggest economic concern of the state, clearly announced 
many policies to promote agriculture and rural development. Many policies from these 
documents encourage development of rural finance and consequently, developing several 
policy-led financial products, for example, agricultural loan with appropriate discount of 
lending rate, can not only appeal to many potential clients but also promote formal loan’s 
development.  
In addition, from the results of this empirical investigation, we draw the following policy 




too high, it brings evidence for the failure of rural formal loan markets to some extent. 
Considering population size in China’s rural areas, we have enough reasons to believe that 
there should be many potential formal loan borrowers who are suffering loan constraints 
because they cannot afford interest rates on formal loans. As we mentioned above, one 
obvious reason for those respondents’ predicaments is that RCCs currently have a monopoly 
in rural formal loan market so that borrowers almost have no multiple options and 
consequently, they might be forced to leave the formal loan market. In order to redress the 
partially failure rural financial system, the Chinese government and POBC should change the 
monopolization of RCCs by allowing more other financial institutions to enter rural financial 
market for a competitive environment. For example, the Chinese government and POBC 
should bend the rules for private or even foreign capital entering the rural financial market so 
as to enlarge the rural financial supply to some extent. Prior to 2005 and 2006, although 
China’s central government has opened up its rural financial market to private or foreign 
microfinance institutions (MFI) (Guo and Jia, 2009; Turvey and Kong, 2010), these few 
licensed institutions with pilot character operate in pretty small regions so that they cannot 
shake RCCs’ monopoly on formal loan disbursement at all. In consequence, if a large number 
of private or foreign financial companies are licensed by the government and POBC, then it 
should be beneficial to promote better competition in rural financial market.  
Another possible reason for those respondents’ predicaments is that the characteristics of 
rural financial demands are usually small, scattered and seasonal as compared to urban 
financial demands so that traditional commercial banks would not like to enter into the rural 
financial market due to high-transaction costs and limited collateral capacity. In China, for 
example, prior to 1995, “ABC withdrew from rural areas and focused primarily in urban 
areas” (Guo and Jia, 2009). And ABC’s urbanization is also an important reason which leads 
to RCCs’ current position of monopoly in China’s rural formal loan market, of course. In 
consequence, the Chinese government and POBC should lay out preferential policies for 
agricultural or rural loan (e.g., exempting financial institutions’ full sales tax and partial 
income tax if their loans disbursement are for agricultural production or rural development) so 
as to attract a great deal financial institutions to penetrate in rural areas. This is also a way to 





Overall, as far as policymakers (i.e., the government and POBC) are concerned, the key 
point of future work is to change the monopolization of current rural financial institutions and 
allow more financial institutions or capital to enter rural financial market so as to promote 
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SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
 
This dissertation used randomized field survey data to estimate lending volume decisions of 
lenders, the number of lending approvals by lenders, and respondents’ attitudes about lending 
rates of formal loans. The sample included rural residents collected from rural Shandong, 
China in July 2010. 
This dissertation provided empirical evidence for lending volume decisions in Chapter 
Two, the number of lending approvals over a period of years in Chapter Three, and 
respondents’ attitudes towards interest rates on formal loans in Chapter Four. The results 
mainly show that rural households’ characteristics were the main affect on the approval 
decision, rather than the lending volume decision covered in Chapter Two. Chapter Three 
elaborates on the finding that households where the head of the house has a higher education 
level and has a large area of land were more likely to be granted a loan by lenders over a 
period of years. Additionally, Chapter Four has a discussion of the finding that respondents’ 
gender and main cash income sources have important influences on the attitudes towards high 
interest rate recognition on formal loan. 
    These findings must be considered when drawing policy recommendations, as the 
potential roles of education and amount of land owned indicate not only increasing rural 
residents’ welfare, but also the ability to allow borrowers to gain a more advantaged position 
in the financial market. Hence, the government at all levels in China should strive to improve 
education in rural areas and protect land rights of all farm families with the aim of increasing 
farmers’ chances for access to formal loans. These findings also give a clear implication that 
female clients, or clients whose main cash income is from farm work, deserve to be paid more 
attention by formal loan lenders, in part because they generally have positive attitudes about 
current lending rates of formal loans. 
The findings bring to light three possible disequilibrium situations between lending and 
borrowing practices, which can all be summed up to the fact that loan demand does not equal 




if a borrower’s desired loan volume does not equal his/her disbursed loan volume. The second 
disequilibrium is a number disequilibrium, if a borrower receives a lower number of loan 
approvals’ times than a number of loan applications’ times. The third disequilibrium is a loan 
rate disequilibrium, if a borrower’s expected interest rate on formal loan does not equal the 
actual interest rate set by the financial institutions. This leads to a question that cannot be 
answered in the study but needs to be answered in the future: how do the household’s 
characteristics affect the disequilibrium between lending and borrowing practices?  
In addition, given the results of this study, two additional questions require answers. First, 
how can the questionnaire design be improved to achieve higher quality data relating 
households’ characteristics? The data should be genuine exogenous when I use them to be 
independent variables for my empirical analysis in the dissertation. If these data are genuine 
exogenous, they can effectively avoid endogeneity problems that arise in empirical analysis. 
Second, what extent do the results apply to other settings? China is a large country and suffers 
unbalanced development in various rural areas and the results may vary across settings. 
Therefore, further research needs to expand the survey area, which can include a number of 




















(ABRIDGED VERSION IN ENGLISH) 
 
NOTE: Author’s translation from Chinese. The questionnaire was designed in Chinese in 
accordance with Chinese reading habits and idiom. 
 
1. Respondent’s gender: ○ male; ○ female.  Household head’ gender: ○ male; ○ female. 
2.Responedent’ age:________; Household head’s age:____________. 
3. How many people do farm work in your family? __________ 
4. How many people do off-farm work in your family?_________ 
5. How many people are over 65 years old in your family?____________ 
6. How many people are under 12 years of age in your family?___________ 
7. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (Please indicate only the last level 
of education completed or the level at which you are currently studying) 
①uneducated (never went to school); ②completed some elementary; ③completed 
elementary; ④completed some middle school; ⑤completed middle school; ⑥completed 
some college or university; ⑦completed college and university. 
8. How many years of the household head do he/she have?____________ 
9. How many Mu of land have you farmed?____________ (Note: 1 Mu≈0.16 Acre ).  
10. Does the household head have skill(s) for working non-farm job? ○ Yes; ○ No. 
11. What is the total worth of all assets (including house, land, fixed assets, etc.) in your 
family (in thousands)?____________________thousand Yuan. 
12. Given that you wish to borrow from a formal financial institution, and comparing the 
interest rate set by the formal institution with the maximum interest rate that you would 
accept, do you feel that the interest rate set by the formal institution is: 
A) too high; B) too low; C) fair 
13. Is your main cash income from farm work? A) Yes; B) No 




A) relatives or friends; B) formal financial institutions; C) usury 
15. Who did you mainly borrow from in the past?  
A) relatives or friends; B) formal financial institutions; C) usury 
16. Did you be granted loan(s) from formal financial institutions over the past five years? 
   A) Yes; B)No; C) Non-application 
17. If you received formal loan (s), then how many times did you be granted by formal 
financial institution over the past five years? And how much of the last loan did you be 
granted by formal financial institution over the past years?  
_________________time(s); _____________________Yuan. 
 
 
